They tried to do it again. And they tried
to do it in Tirap again.
A group of some 40 terrorists, suspected to
be from NSCN(K), attacked the camp of Assam Rifles in Tirap district in Andhra
Pradesh.
Since there was prior intelligence this
time, terrorists fire saw retaliatory attack by the personnel of the
paramilitary force mandated to guard the India-Myanmar border.
No casualty was reported in exchange of
fire that lasted for 10 minutes.
In an earlier incident in the district on April
2, NSCN(K) had ambushed an Army convoy (4 Rajput Regiment) killing 3 soldiers.
It was around 6 AM.
Alertness and prior intelligence is natural
in these tense circumstances. Just three days ago, in the deadliest attack on
the Indian Army in the Northeast India, terrorists killed 18 soldiers of the 6
Dogra Regiment. NSCN(K), ULFA (I) and KYKL among others are being said to be behind
this cowardly attack on the road-opening patrol that was not fully prepared to
take on militants.
But that is a mistake or laxity or
'intelligence failure' that the Indian security establishment cannot afford in
crisis-hit regions like J&K or in different states of the North-East.
The incident happened even if the Indian
security establishment knew that the Khaplang faction of NSCN would try to hit
targets in quick succession to prove its relevance after it broke the ceasefire
in March 2015.
The intelligence establishment, with its
multiple agencies, including the Indian Army and local police, expected attacks
to happen, yet they could not see what was coming on June 4 in the Chandel
district.
Like today's incident in the Tirap
district, involving a large group of terrorists (as is being reported), Chandel
attack, too, involved a large group. Like Chandel, Tirap, too, is a district
bordering Myanmar. In Chandel, it was around 6 AM, according to NSCN(K), the
outfit which took responsibility of the attack. In Tirap, it was at 2:30 AM.
So, the terrorists want to attack those
units of Indian security establishment, including its Army and paramilitary
forces, which they find not equipped enough to retaliate - like it was a
road-opening-patrol in Chandel - like it was at 2:30 AM at Assam Rifles camp in
a remote area of Tirap.
If this sort of 'hit and run' is going to
be the strategy of many groups of the North-East, including NSCN(K),
intelligence agencies are going to face an even more difficult job at hand to
thwart such attacks.
Going by the developments, it is quite sure
that the intelligence agencies are not getting local support or are not able to
exploit the means at this end.
India-Myanmar border is 15 Kms from the
place where Chandel attack took place. Even if it was very near to the Myanmar
border, crossing the border undetected after perpetrating such a deadly attack
would be impossible for such a large group without local support. It holds true
even in case the group members scattered here and there and crossed the border
in small units or individually or even if they stayed back in the Indian territory,
mixed among the villagers.
And today's attack in Tirap holds same
'intelligence' logic. Assam Rifles guard the India-Myanmar border but they
could not gauge from where the terrorists came and to where they fled away
after opening fire. At least, that information is not in the public domain so
far. Though Assam Rifles had intelligence about an upcoming attack, they could
not trace out such a large group. But if they could escape as it was dark, it
was not possible without the local support - the rapid movement of such a large
group after a retaliatory attack.
And such 'intelligence failures' owing to
the 'non-cooperation of the local people' in many North-East states give rise
to various debates including Delhi's negligence of the entire territory, shabby
state of development and poor infrastructure and the imposition of Armed Forces
Special Powers Act (AFSPA).
When I wrote in an article on June 4 attack
that we needed to see 'it is to be seen how the government of India moves next
morning', it was basically about addressing this 'local' element - to come to
the board and to chalk a roadmap for a permanent solution.
A thorough preparedness, being alert round
the clock, and a more intense intelligence gathering mechanism can thwart the
possibility of damage in such attacks. Yes, but it cannot thwart the
possibility of such attacks.
That needs comprehensive sanitization of the
affected areas by the Indian security establishment. But that cannot happen
without local support.
And we cannot trust on the government in
Myanmar. Terrorist groups active in the North-East operate from Myanmar. The
government there has not enough means, political and military, to take on these
outfits and the government was forced to sign an agreement with S. S. Khaplang.
Such groups also get vital Chinese support
which has interests in the promoting insurgency in the North-East with its
claim on Arunachal Pradesh.
