Paradropping Kiran Bedi to win Delhi,
when Delhi BJP was facing problems of factions and internal feuds and a waning
public interest (of Delhi's public) in Modi Wave with letdown of the January 10
Abhinandan Rally that was marketed in the name of Narendra Modi, proved out to
be what it had to be.
Looking at her as someone a panacea
for all BJP woes in Delhi was the final element to complete the reversal of
BJP’s electoral fortunes. Before bringing in Bedi, senior BJP leaders were not
taken into confidence. Also, with her induction, the local leadership was
virtually disengaged from campaigning that further alienated the Delhi BJP
workers who were already bogged down by the factions.
Considering Kiran Bedi a masterstroke
when there were equal chances that the decision could have backfired also – was a
poorly devised electoral strategy as the party had no time for an alternative
in case of a negative progress report and that is exactly
what has happened.
Kiran Bedi, before it, was never
tested politically, and did not have the privilege of a
credibly clean figure, something that
Kejriwal enjoyed. She had her fair share of controversies like allegations of
inflated airfare bills, controversy on her daughter’s admission in a medical
college, her U-turn on not joining politics, her U-turn on Narendra Modi and
controversies related to her career as an IPS officer including the spat with
lawyers in Delhi that make her an un-middle class personality as well.
BJP miscalculated on Kiran Bedi’s
appeal thinking it could be linked to Narendra Modi’s mass appeal and could
well be used as an alternative, local face for BJP.
BJP miscalculated that it could take
on an activist-turned politician with another activist-turned politician hoping
their days when they worked together would give the party strategists insight
into countering Kejriwal’s campaign more effectively – pinning Kejriwal in his
own way.
BJP paradropped Kiran Bedi just 22
days before the polls to face and already established
player who was enjoying consistently higher popularity ratings with virtually
no opposition on the scale. Kiran Bedi did not have the time even to re-compose
herself, let alone the basic essentials like reading the politics of Delhi in
the context of an AAP Vs BJP contest, speaking the political language and thus
making moves accordingly.
Instead, she kept on speaking like a
police officer, narrowed down by her administrative experience and remaining
confined to that when the need was to widen politically, when the canvas was
not the certain defined realms of a professional obligation but an undefined,
political landscape open to the dynamic changes as the campaigning progressed.
That could have worked for an activist but certainly not for a politician.
Kiran Bedi’s induction and immediate elevation
in BJP was based on perceptions around her with almost no time and no exercises
to taste how these perceptions play out in the electoral arena. She was made
the commander of the final stage of the battle when there was no time left to
strategise further and the results are before us today.
In the 70-member Delhi assembly, AAP
is expected to end up with 65 seats (it may be even 67) while writing this and
BJP’s ‘three seats don’t include Kiran Bedi’s assembly constituency
Krishnanagar’.